Logical inference leads to one of the major interpretations of probability theory called logical interpretation, in which the probability is seen as a measure of the plausibility of a logical statement under incomplete information. In this paper, assuming that our usual inference procedure makes sense for every set of logical propositions represented in terms of commuting projectors on a given Hilbert space, we extend the logical interpretation to quantum mechanics and derive the Born rule. Our result implies that, from the epistemological viewpoints, we can regard quantum mechanics as a natural extension of the classical probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Inference is one of the essential building blocks in various branches of mathematical science: Jaynes' derivation of statistical mechanics [1, 2] is based on the inference of the probability distribution most likely to reproduce given expectations of thermodynamic variables. Since the era of Laplace [3] , probability has been more or less regarded as a measure of likelihood of statements being valid, although there coexists the interpretation that the probability is nothing but the relative frequency.
The inference plays an important role even to understand fundamental aspects of probability theory. The following is shown by Cox [4] [5] [6] : Suppose there is a measure of the plausibility of statements being valid under incomplete information. If the measure follows inference rules consistent with our common sense, then the measure satisfies the product rule and the sum rule of the probability, and hence it can be interpreted as the probability. In other words, without invoking the notion of the relative frequency, probability theory can be derived by assuming reasonable inference rules under incomplete information. This derivation is called Cox's theorem, which allows us to see the probability as a natural extension of the truth values of the propositions. This interpretation of probability is called the logical interpretation of probability [7] .
Recently, several inference methods are becoming utilized to reconstruct quantum mechanics. The equations of motions such as the Schrödinger equation [8] , the Pauli equation [9] , and the Klein-Gordon equation [10] are derived under the auxiliary requirement that the plausibility of the experimental outcomes is robust under the slight changes of the experimental parameters. Wave function and the Schrödinger equation are derived from other auxiliary assumptions [11, 12] .
In this paper, we show that the measure of the plausibility takes the form of the Born rule by extending the argument mentioned above to the Hilbert space and the projectors thereof. Interestingly enough, for the commuting projectors, Lüders rule of the conditional probability [13] is also derived. Analogously to the derivation of Cox's theorem, throughout our discussion, we will assume that the plausibility measures follow our standard inference procedures for commuting projectors. Our derivation, hence, enables us to see both the rules as the measures of plausibility on which our inference makes sense for the commuting projectors.
II. INTERPRETATIONS OF PROBABILITY
We first recall the standard definition of probability. Suppose we are given n mutually different elements ω 1 , · · · , ω n . The set of all the elements is denoted by Ω := {ω 1 , · · · , ω n }, and the subset thereof is written by A, B, · · · . A set F of the subsets A, B, · · · is called the σ-algebra if it satisfies
Here ∅ stands for the empty set and A c is the complement of A defined by A ∩ A c = ∅ and A ∪ A c = Ω. Then, the probability Pr(A) is defined as a map from F to [0, 1], which satisfies
To give the interpretations of the probability Pr(A), we construct a mathematical quantity which is easy to understand intuitively and fulfills the conditions (2). Here we take three examples of well-known interpretations of the probability.
Frequency Interpretation. First, let us show that the relative frequency of the events occurring satisfies the above conditions. Consider a coin flipping game, whose possible outcomes are either finding the head (H) or the tail (T) of the coin. Thus, we have Ω = {H, T} and F = {∅, {H}, {T}, Ω}. Note that Ω = {H} ∪ {T} and {H} ∩ {T} = ∅. Now we repeat the coin flipping game N times and write the number of finding H as N H and that of finding T as N T , respectively. The relative frequency of finding H is N H /N and that of finding T is N T /N . By setting Pr(∅) = 0, Pr({H}) = N H /N , Pr({T}) = N T /N , and Pr(Ω) = 1, we find Pr(Ω) = Pr({H} ∪ {T}) = Pr({H}) + Pr({T}) = 1, (3) which shows that the relative frequency satisfies the conditions (2) . This is the reason why we may interpret the probability as relative frequency.
Subjective Interpretation. The second example is Dutch Book argument (DBA) [14] . In DBA, we consider a bet on whether a given hypothesis (it rains tomorrow, for example) is true. If the hypothesis is true, then the bettor obtains the stake S. If it is not the case, he obtains nothing. Let us now suppose that the bettor pays the wager qS, where q is called the betting quotient. Then the net payoff of the bet is S − qS if the hypothesis is true, and −qS otherwise.
In [14] , de Finetti showed that the bookie can construct a set of the bets in such a way that the bettor always get the net loss, if the set of the betting quotients does not obey the conditions (2): the fair betting quotients can be seen as the probability. See [15] for the proof.
DBA leads to the subjective interpretation of the probability, since the betting quotients indicates how much the bettor feels the hypotheses true. The salient feature of DBA is that the bettor can freely determine his own betting quotients: In a bet, it is not necessary that all the participants of the bets have the same betting quotients. This implies that in the subjective interpretation we may assign several differenct probabilities (degree of belief) for the plausibility of a hypothesis by our own decision.
Logical Interpretation. The third example is the degree of the plausibility of a given proposition conditioned by the prior information [4] [5] [6] , which is the central issue of this paper. Once the plausibility agrees with the conditions (2), the probability is seen as a natural extension of the truth value of the proposition under uncertainty.
In what follows, the Boolean operations play an important role, since they characterize the relations among the (composite) propositions made through the logical operations. Given the truth values of the several propositions, we can find the truth values of the propositions associated with them by the Boolean operations. Since we will make the argument to see the probability as an extension of the truth value, we shall provide a discussion on the Boolean algebra below.
First, let us show that the σ-algebra F = {A, B, C . . . } mentioned earlier is closed under the Boolean operations AND (∧), OR (∨), and NOT (¬). This implies that we may establish the logic on the σ-algebra, because the Boolean operation represents the relation among the logical propositions.
To this end, we introduce the Boolean operations by
We then clearly see the following properties, that is,
Idempotence
2. Commutativity
5. Duality
Since these properties define the Boolean algebra, the σ-algebra is found to be closed under the Boolean operations. On the basis of this observation, we may safely regard the element ω i as an elementary proposition, which could be true or false. The subsets A, B, · · · ∈ F are therefore the composite propositions made by the Boolean operations, and the set Ω is seen as the set of all these. We then formally introduce the measure of conditional plausibility, denoted by A|B ∈ R, whose value quantifies the degree of plausibility that A is true, given B is true. We hereafter show that A|B satisfies the conditions (2) under reasonable assumptions given below.
Following [4, 5] , we put two assumptions on A|B. They are mathematical expressions of our usual inference procedures. The first assumption is the following: Assumption 1 Given the propositions A, B, C, there exists a monotonic continuous function F (x, y) such that
The assumption 1 implies that the plausibility of the composite proposition A ∧ B given C is true is related to two plausibilities and we infer the plausibility of A ∧ B|C from successive inferences of B|C and A|B ∧ C. From this assumption, by using the properties of the Boolean algebra, Cox found in [4] [5] [6] that the function F (x, y) satisfies
and therefore takes the form of
where w(x) is a monotonic continuous function to [0, 1], which assumes the existence of its inverse w −1 . Note that Eq. (12) reads
which is an expression of the inference rule (10) in terms of w(P |Q). Further, we make the following assumption on w(x):
Assumption 2 There exists a monotonic continuous function S(x) such that w(A|B) = S(w(¬A|B)). (14)
The assumption 2 means that the plausibility of a given proposition can be inferred from that of its negation. Cox found that Eq. (14) yields
which clearly turns to w(A|B) + w(¬A|B) = 1.
Eqs. (13) and (16) 
whose proof is given in the Appendix. Let us prove Eq. (2b). Substituting Ω to A in Eq. (10), we find
Since Ω ∧ B = B and Ω ∧ C = C, Eq. (18) turns to
which proves Eq. (2b) for the fixed C. Furthermore, putting A = Ω in Eq. (16), we find
Hence, from Eq. (17), we obtain
which shows Eq. (2c) for the fixed C. By exchanging C for B and summing up all the results, we may set
meaning that the degree of the plausibility can be seen as the conditional probability. Note that we have not used the repeatability or frequency in the above argument. From the viewpoint of the logical interpretation, thus, we are allowed to apply the probability theory to not necessarily repeatable events such as earthquakes, weathers, and supernovae explosions.
III. QUANTUM EXTENSION
In the following, we extend the preceding argument to quantum mechanics. Let H be a finite dimensional Hilbert space and P, Q, · · · be the projectors acting on H. Since the eigenvalues of the projectors are 1 or 0, the eigenvalues can be seen as the truth values, and hence every projector can be thought of as a proposition.
Analogously to A|B in the preceding section, let us now introduce P |Q ∈ R as the degree of the plausibility for the proposition P , given Q is true. We suppose that P |Q are well-defined for all the pairs of the projectors, even for those which do not necessarily commute.
We hereafter make a discussion to find a concrete expression of P |Q. For this pourpose, we need to construct a Boolean subalgebra in a set of commuting projectors. When P and Q commute with each other, we may define the logical operations by associating them with corresponding projectors:
where 1 1 is the identity operator. Then, similarly to Eqs. (1), we can define a set C of commutative operators such that
It is clear that the elements in C satisfies the properties (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) . Hence the set C is found to be a Boolean subalgebra. Two remarks are in order. First, 0, 1 1 in C correspond to ∅, Ω in F , respectively. Second, the set C is not unique: we can find infinitely many sets satisfying (24). Indeed, given a projector P , we can construct C = {0, P, ¬P, 1 1}, implying that any projector is an element of some Boolean subalgebra C.
Here we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3 Our inference in the sense of Eq. (10) and (14) is valid for any set C.
We then obtain the proposition as follows:
Theorem 1 For any pair of the commuting projectors P and Q, the degree of plausibility P |Q can be interpreted as the conditional probability. Moreover, if dim H ≥ 3, then there exists a density matrix ρ such that the conditional probability is written as
Proof. From the assumption 3, if we identify A, B, C in F with P, Q, R in C, w(P |Q) can be seen as the conditional probability for any C. From the assumption 1 and 2, we obtain w(P ∨ Q|R) = w(P |R) + w(Q|R) − w(P ∧ Q|R)(26)
for P, Q, R ∈ C. Equation (26) is reduced to w(P ∨ Q|R) = w(P |R) + w(Q|R) for P Q = 0, (27) which is a sufficient condition of the Gleason theorem [16] when dim H ≥ 3 and R is fixed. Therefore we obtain w(P |Q) = tr(ρ Q P ).
Here ρ Q is a density matrix which is dependent on Q. By setting P = Q, we observe
which means that ρ Q has the non-trivial support only on the eigenspace of Q. Hence, with an appropriate density matrix ρ, we can write
Plugging Eq. (30) into Eq. (28), we find
Since w(P |Q) is found to be the conditional probability for any P, Q, we may write w(P |Q) = Pr(P |Q). We then find Eq. (25), which completes the proof. Equation (25) has the same form as Lüders rule of conditional probability [13] , even though its domain is restricted to the commuting projectors. We further obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1 The probability to find the proposition P being true is given by the Born rule:
Pr(P ) = tr(ρP ).
(32)
Proof. We set Q = 1 1. Then we can make use of the theorem 1 and obtain Pr(P ) = Pr(P |1 1) = tr(ρP ),
which proves the corollary. Since the Born rule is derived through the commuting projectors P, 1 1, we can regard the Born rule as the degree of the plausibility of the proposition P under no information.
We further show the following:
Theorem 2 Equation (25) can be seen as a probability for any pair of non-commuting projectors P , Q.
Proof. For the fixed Q, we have Pr(P |Q) ≥ 0 since the positivity of ρ Q in Eq. (30). Pr(1 1|Q) = 1 and Pr(P + R|Q) = Pr(P |Q) + Pr(R|Q) for projectors P, R such that P ∧ R = 0 are derived by direct calculation. Thus, under the identification 0, 1 1 with ∅, Ω, we find Eqs. (2) for fixed Q in Eq. (25). Since this argument is valid for any Q, we complete the proof. Thus we have arrived at the Lüders rule starting from the degrees of the plausibility with the inference rules. Note that the logical interpretation of Lüders rule is valid only for the commuting projectors.
IV. VIOLATION OF THE INFERENCE RULE
In the previous section, we have derived the Lüders rule by assuming the validity of the inference rules (13) and (16) for any set C. This suggests that the inference rules do not necessarily hold for non-commuting projectors.
Let us construct an example to show the violation of the inference rule. We introduce ∆ = Pr(P ∧ Q|R) − Pr(P |R) Pr(Q|P ∧ R). (34) and check its behavior. If ∆ = 0, then the inference rule (13) holds. Now we set H = C 2⊗2 and
where 1 1 2 stands for the identity operator on C 2 . We have defined | ↑ = ( Furthermore, let us set
which is a mixture of the completely mixed state and a pure separable state. We then find
Thus, the inference rule (13) no longer holds except the completely mixed case p = 1 and has the maximal violation when the state is completely pure p = 0. To conclude, the conditional probability (25) does not obey our inference rule (13) for the non-commuting projectors except the completely mixed case.
the logical interpretation. Analogously, our results obtained here may provide the conceptual bases of quantum machine learning [19] , which is a recent central issue in quantum information theory [20] .
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Appendix: Proof of Eq. (17) To prove Eq. (17), we follow the argument given in [6] . By using Eqs. (9b), (13) and (14), we obtain which completes the proof.
